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PREFACE
This study of the role of operations analysis in the Navy was made
at the United States Naval Postgraduate School during the latter half of
the academic year, 1953-1954. The purpose of this study is to acquaint
naval officers further with the use of operations analysis as an aid in
solving complex operational problems.
The definition of operations analysis introduced here, in terms of
optimization of achievement of purpose, was first suggested by Professor
C.C. Torrance. In the writer's opinion, this definition describes oper-
ations analysis more clearly than any of the many others contained in
the current literature.
The author is grateful to Professor W.R. Church and to Professor
C.C. Torrance of the United States Naval Postgraduate School for their
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A study is presented here of the role of operations analysis in the
United States Navy. A definition of operations analysis is given, and
the general implications of this definition are discussed. The method-
ology Tor solving problems arising in complex operations, the relation
between the analyst and the executive, the problems of decision inherent
in every operations analysis study, and the scope of operations analysis
are examined. An example of a past application of operations analysis
is described in order to discern the conditions necessary for successful
accom: lishment of operations analysis studies.
The increasing need for operations analysis in the Navy is empha-
sized in light of the impact of technological advances on the military
sciences. This need may, in part, be met through the use of officers
formally trained in operations analysis. Put certain problems arise
when members of the military service are employed as analysts, and these
problems are quite different from those attendant upon the use of ci-
vilians. These problems are discussed in order to determine how the
Navy can best meet its need for operations analysis.
In past military applications, operations analysis has been largely
confined to prol lems arising in combat operations. In view of the wide-
spread applications of the methods of operations analysis in otht.r fields,
recommendations are made as to future possible applications of operations





_JThe cone-apt of using teams of scientists to work at operational
levels in military commands was of British origin, when a small
trouble-shooting party of scientists was attached to the early-
warning radar chain in 194^. Operations analysis in the United
States Navy had its formal beginning in April 1942 when a group of
civilian scientists was assigned to the Navy to carry cut research
in anti-submarine operation. These groups of scientists achieved
rka le successes in resolving wartime operational problems.
Similar groups of scientists were then added to the other military
services. In the course of their work, many members of these groups
became convinced that the techniques used in operations analysis were
not limited to military problems; chiefly as a result of their effort,
widespread applications of these techniques are being made in industry
today.
Because of the recent origin of operations analysis, there are
many different formulations of its definition and scope. While a con-
siderable amount of literature dealing with past applications of oper-
ations analysis exists, and an Operations Research Society of America
has been formed to encourage and publicize current efforts in the
field, much work remains to be done to acquaint all potential users
with its true meaning and possible uses. It is quite obvious that
this task is of such magnitude as to preclude the possibility of its
being accomplished in a study of this nature. It is felt, however,
that a study of operations analysis in the Navy ma 3' be made here.
1
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The author, along with 14 other nav^l officers, is currently
completing a two year curriculum in operations analysis at the United
States Naval Postgraduate School. The requirements for entrance into
this curriculum are a minimum of six years operational experience and
some demonstrated degree of proficiency in mathematics. Consideration
of this background makes it evident that there are many officers in the
Navy better able to describe the operational features of the problems
discussed here; on the other hand, there are many scientists better able
to describe the scientific nature of operations analysis. Our particular
background does, however, enable us to discuss many naval problems from
both the scientific and operational point of view.
Since, to the author's knowledge, nothing has been written on the
problems attendant upon the use of naval officers in the role of oper-
ations analysts, investigation of these particular problems would appear




".THAT IS OPERATIONS ANALYSIS
1. Definition of Operations Analysis
Operations analysis is a rapidly expanding discipline. Partial or
interim definitions of it range from quality control and cost analysis
to personnel management. There seems as yet to be no generally accepted
definition of the subject. In the most general sense, operations analysis
is the scientific analysis of a going operation.' The following definition
of operations analysis (operations research) resulted from the experiences
of the Operations Research Group gained during the war years (7,Page 1):
Operations research is a scientific method of providing
executive departments with a quantitative basis for decisions
regarding operations under their control.
Since this study is concerned with operations analysis in the Navy, and
the Operations Research Group was the formal organization created to
conduct research into operations for the Navy, this definition may be logi-
cally chosen as the starting point for our discussion. In order to develop
an acceptable interpretation of it, let us consider the terms " a scientific
method", "executive", and "decisions".
2. A Scientific Method
One may well be disturbed by the vagueness of the phrase, " a
scientific method", and the military commander may well question how an
operations analyst can solve a problem in a manner in any way different
from that followed by members of his staff. Now in many respects the two
solutions may not differ at all, for in the sense that the staff member
observes data, collects facts, and bases his solution upon them, he is
employing scientific methods. The differences between the methods of the
analyst and the staff member may be merely in the objectivity of their
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observations, the -elaborateness of the trials and experiments conducted,
or in the complexity of the respective calculations. The use of scien-
tific methods is not restricted to the scientist; indeed, most people
employ these methods daily to a certain degree. However, we note from
the above definition that the analyst restricts himself to the use of a
scientific method. This restriction does not hold for the staff member,
who, if he does not use a scientific method exclusively, may base his
solution at least in part upon guidance from higher authority or upon
speculation (intuition, native judgment, or other "faculty").
Guidance from higher authority consists of directives, and these
directives are laws to which the staff member must necessarily adhere, in
the same manner that the scientist must follow the laws of science. VJhere
directives and scientific laws have their basis in fact, and are applicaVle
to a given situation, both sets of laws form perfectly acceptable bases
for the solution of problems, '.<hile directives frequently change, this
in itself is not proof that they were originally wrong, but rather empha-
sizes their dependence upon situations which can change in such a manner
as to render them inapplicable. Incidentally, scientific/ hypotheses
and doctrines also change as mankind's state of knowledge increases,
and scientists must take great pains to use only those scientific princi-
ples that are applicable to a given situation.
The method of consulting authority has limited application. In gen-
eral, rules and policies can not be adequately formulated to cover every
complex situation. In many cases, guidance from higher authority may be
non-existent, or directives may be conflicting. The choice of a method




To avoid giving an impression of uncertainty in a decision reached
by speculation, people customarily resort to such phrases as, "In my judg-
ment", or "It has been my experience". When a person expresses such a
decision it is difficult to know how much of it is pure speculation and
how much is actually the result of applying scientific methods. It is
this curious blend of speculation and scientific reasoning which guides '
most of us in solving complex problems, and one thus speaks of an experi-
enced man, or of one who has an intuitive feel for an operation. Oper-
ations analysis does not regard the views of experienced men lightly; on
the contrary, by using formal scientific methods, it is often led to the
same conclusion as the operator who learned by doing. It does seek, how-
ever, to apply scientific methods as rigorously as possible in all cases,
and thereby increase the reliability and certainty of an operational
decision.
Although written before the formal advent of operations analysis,
K. Pearson (9, Page 12) described clearly what is meant by the aims and
method of science:
The classification of facts and the formation of absolute judg-
ments upon the basis of this classification - judgments independent
of the idiosyncrasies of the individual mind-essentially sum up the
aim and method of modern science. The scientific man has above all
things to strive at self-elimination in his judgments, to provide an
argument which is as true for each individual mind as for his own.
The classification of facts, the recognition of their sequence and
relative significance is the function of science, and the habit of
forming a judgment upon these facts unbiased by personal feeling is
characteristic of what may be termed the scientific frame of mind.
Operations analysts have accepted Pearson's definition of the scientific
frame of mind, but doubt that there is any such thing as THE scientific
method, believing rather as J.B. Conant (2, Page 45) has stated:

There is no such thing as THE scientific method. If there was,
surely an examination of the history of physics, chemistry, and bi-
ology would reveal it. For as I have already pointed out, few would
deny that it is the progress in physics, chemistry, and experimental
biology which gives everyone confidence in the procedures of the
scientist. Yet a careful examination of these subjects fails to
reveal any one method by means of which the masters in these fields
broke new ground.
It is for this reason that analysts choose to describe their work as the
application of "a scientific method", preferring to let the nature of
the problem dictate the particular method to be employed. It is also
the reason why operations analysis is customarily regarded as a team
effort, with the members drawn from many different fields of science.
In summary, we have seen that although there are various ways in
which problems can be solved, the operations analyst restricts himself
to only one, the application of a scientific method. To the question of
whether or not this is sufficiently novel in itself to be called oper-
ations analysis, the answer is no, for like the famous character in
L'oliere's comedy who had been speaking prose all his life without knowing
it, so man has applied scientific methods since the day he first began to
draw inferences from observations, crude though the methods might be.
3. The Analyst and the Executive
One notes from the definition in Section 1, that the separate
existence of the analyst and the executive is implied. Writing on this
subject, P.M. Morse and G.E. Kimball (7, Pages 2 and 133) state:
This separation of the duties and activities of the research
worker and the executive is important; the experience of the past
ten years has only emphasized this importance. Experience has
shown, for instance, that a person with operations research train-
ing, when placed in an executive position, loses a great deal of
his usefulness as an operations research worker (though he may
become an excellent executive). The requirement that the executive

reach a decision concerning an operation is to some extent antagonistic
to the requirement that he look at it scientifically and impersonally
as would be required in operations research. The proper use of an oper-
ations research group by an executive department implies a sort of
symbiosis, requiring on the part of each, trust in the other's activi-
ties and respect of the others prerogatives It is a funda-
mental property of operations research that operations research groups
must have broad knowledge, but should have very little power and
responsibility. Operations research workers must be able to think
about the military situation impersonally and impartially, and this
can be done best if they are relieved of the responsibility of issuing
orders. Their conclusions must take the form of advice to some high
ranking officer, for him to make the orders (if he sees fit).
The writer does not believe that these views are necessarily correct. One
may well wonder what yardstick of measurement was used to arrive at the conclu-
sion that a person with operations research training loses a great deal of
his effectiveness as an operations research worker when placed in an execu-
tive position. It is of course true that the pressure of other duties may
decrease the amount of time that the executive may devote to pure oper-
ations research. But the perspective attained by operations analysis
experience may sometimes find its greatest payoff in the guidance it pro-
vides an executive in appraising the conclusions and recommendations of
analysts.
As far as the attitude of mutual trust between the analyst and the
executive is concerned, it seems to the writer that a good healthy
attitude of check-and-counter check is more in keeping with the spirit
of operations analysis. Analysts, in describing their working routine,
note that one of the greatest benefits of using a team is that which
accrues from the very rigorous criticism of a study by all the members
of the team. It is, of course, the very aim of a scientific method, as
Pearson stated, "to provide an argument which is as true for each indi-
vidual mind as his (the analysts) own". To advocate that the executive

should base his decision upon a study which he is incapable of doing
hiraself (and presumably understanding) is to advocate that he should use
guidance from authority to solve his problems. It is difficult to believe
that any executive is going to base his decision upon a complex mathe-
matical formula with which he is unfamiliar, and the analyst is fully
aware of this. As a result, the formal operations analysis study is
prepared so that inferences can be clearly draxvn by anyone reading the re-
port. In this sense the executive uses a scientific method, and it is
only a natter of organization and qualifications that determines who
actually does the calculating.
It is true that the executive cannot view impersonally an operation
aV.out which he has to make a decision, for in any thought process, bias
and knowledge are intimately connected. Certainly no one contends that
the scientist, whose methods the analyst seeks to emulate, is an unbiased
person and thus incapable of doing scientific research on a subject. The
history of science reveals many instances where only the dogged determi-
nation and persistent belief in his views carried the scientist through
long years of criticism, until he was able to prove in an acceptable
manner that he was correct. .Then the scientist's theories prove incon-
sistent with scientific methods they are discarded, and consistent
theories are adopted. The analyst and the executive, being human, must
work in a similar manner, and there seems to be no reason why the
executive should have any more difficulty in overcoming bias than the
analyst or anyone else. A good executive begins his decision by calling
for the facts, and thus follows a scientific approach.
As to the idea that the responsibility of decision is actually
antagonistic to impersonal and scientific appraisal, it would seem that
such an antagonism can occur only when it is considered that there are
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aspects of an operational problem outside the purview of the analyst,
such as political considerations. The proper solution in any such situ-
ation is, of course, not to sequester the analyst, but to broaden his
purview.
Since in military applications of operations analysis the analyst
has usually been a civilian, and thus separate from the executive, one
can question if the use of a separate organization, whose members employ
scientific methods to assist the executive in his problems, is sufficient
to be called operations analysis. Again we are led to an answer in the
negative, for while one may have difficulty in establishing the date at
which the advisory body changed from soothsayers to men of science,
this concept is not new. In our lifetime we have become accustomed to
executives employing management engineers, efficiency experts, consult-
ing engineers, and a host of similar scientific advisors.
It is only when we direct our thoughts to problems of decision
regarding an operation that we discover that operations analysis is indeed
a new discipline.
4. Problems of Decision
From a reading of the definition in Section.], the reader is lead to
the idea that somehow the analyst is given a problem, applies a scien-
tific .aethod to solve it, and then hands the solution to the executive
who may or may not follow it in determining his final course of action.
The writer does not mean to be unnecessarily critical of this definition,
for it is intended to be a very broad one, but in its generality it fails
to describe the essentially new feature of operations analysis: the very
nature of the problem of operations analysis.

There are two problems of decision in every operations analysis
study. The first problem is to decide upon the purpose of the operation.
In many cases this is a most difficult decision. Often, the optimal
conduct of an operation is comparatively simple to determine, once the
decision regarding purpose of the operation has been made. It is the
idea of employing scientific methods to decide upon the purpose of an
operation, and then of optimizing the achievement of this purpose that
is truly new and of such importance as to be called a new discipline.
World War II marked the first time that large organizations (in this
case the military) formally adopted the practice of having both trained
scientists and executives view the entire complex operation, determine
its purpose, and devise means to optimize the achievement of this
purpose. It was this procedure in solving complex operational problems
that gave unexpectedly great returns, for very little expenditure of
effort.
In some cases it is fairly simple to decide upon the purpose of an
operation, but in any case this is the starting point in operations
analysis. A case discussed in the current literature demonstrates very
clearly how meaningless it is to talk about operations analysis until
the decision regarding purpose of the operation has been made. In this
particular example, an analyst on field duty observed that a certain
group of men spent a long time waiting in a mess line. Noting that two
tubs were used for rinsing and two tubs for washing the trays, the
analyst, by a few simple calculations, was able to show that the waiting
line could be eliminated if instead three tubs were used for washing,
and one for rinsing. This was cited as a case where operations analysis,
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using solely the equipment at hand, was able to perform a small miracle.
A humorous and caustic comment appeared in The Operations uesearch
Society Journal for November 1953, containing a ficticious interview
with the hardened mess sergeant who was purported to have remembered
the case. He recalled that the "old man" had said to follow the advice,
but that they quickly went back to the old routine when the analyst
left because the bacteria count got so high in the rinse tubs that half
the men were in sick bay with dysentry, and in any case, "everyone"knew
that it was good for the men to stand in line to develop their leg
muscles for long marches.
The case is a humorous and trivial one, but its extension to more
serious cases is obvious. While both the analyst and the mess sergeant
may have employed scientific methods, they arrived at opposite conclu-
sions, for they each solved a different problem. The thing that is
lacking to make this a case for operations analysis is a decision on
the purpose of the entire operation. Once it is made, it is obvious
that reaching an agreeable solution could be a simple matter.
The actual formulation of a problem must be a joint effort between
the analyst and the executive. As members of the Operations Research
Group have pointed out, it is not to be expected that nontechnical
officers, immersed in the pressures of command responsibilities, should
be able to formulate effectively the problems for the analyst to work
on, rather, the analyst must get close enough to the action to help in
its formulation. It is in this respect that operations analysis differs
markedly from the more familiar "completed staff work" upon which the
executive is often forced to rely.
11

Once the purpose of an operation has been decided upon, a solution
must be obtained. The particular method of solution will depend upon
the nature of the problem. Often the collection and analysis of exist-
ind data is sufficient. V.Tiere this is lacking, controlled experiments
or trials may be used. In more complex problems, a theoretical approach
may be used, a working hypothesis developed, and calculations made or
trials conducted to substantiate the hypothesis, '.'/here they exist,
alternative solutions are drawn up, and suitable measures of effective-
ness devised to effect a choice between the alternatives.
'tfe have briefly discussed the methods of operations analysis, the
people who may perform it, and the essentially new character of it. Be-
cause some disagreement does exist as to whether the analyst and the
executive must be separate, let U3 define operations analysis for the
remainder of this study as follows:
Operations analysis is the application of scientific disciplines
to determine the purpose, and to optimize the achievement of
purpose of operations under some degree of control of an executive.
It is left to the reader the prerogative of deciding whether or not the
analyst and the executive can or should be one and the same person.
There still remains the important problem of showing where operations
analysis can be applied.
5. Scope of Operations Analysis
IVhenever a new discipline is introduced, one encounters people who
arbitrarily decree that while the new discipline may work in some cases,
other cases are outside its field; one also encounters people who en-




The history of science is filled with cases where the former have
almost insisted that man remain ignorant, because it was felt that a
particular problem was outside the legitimate field of science. As an
example, on June 22, 1633, the Congregation of Prelates and Cardinals
stated:
The doctrine that the earth is neither the centre of the universe,
nor immovable, but moves even with a daily rotation, is absurd,
and both theologically and philosophically false, and at the least
an error of faith.
Today, no one questions that cosmical problems are the legitimate field
of science, yet it took nearly two hundred years before a decree was
issued (1822) allowing books teaching the motion of the earth about the
sun to be published and printed in Rome. Undoubtedly mankind has pro-
gressed a great deal since the Middle Ages and no longer has such an
antipathy toward science; however, the common current attitude of in-
difference is little better.
Today, we still resolve a great number of problems purely on an
emotional basis. As an example with which we are all familiar, let us
turn briefly to the field of politics. We vote for a particular man
because he belongs to a particular race, or the newspapers describe
him as a great family man, or for a hundred different reasons, and we
sum them all up and say, "He's a better man". But in many cases we
fail to define the operation or answer the question "Better for what
purpose?" We commonly regard these problems as being outside the field
of science, and make laws and regulations based upon personal feelings.
Such laws often become cumbersome, so that we seek to change them. In
the Twenties, a man with a bottle of liquor and a twenty dollar gold
piece would be arrested for carrying the liquor; today he would be
arrested for carrying the gold piece, yet the nature of neither of these
13

objects changed in the interim years. As members of a democracy, we
believe that laws should be enacted which guarantee the greatest good
to the greatest number of people, yet in many cases our voting record
fails to support this belief. This may not be the fault of the voter,
for often he does not possess all of the facts and must make his de-
cision on a purely individual basis.
Can the application of the methods of operations analysis give
guidance in problems of this sort? It seems to the writer that in
every instance where it is possible to define the purpose of the opera-
tion, and to apply scientific methods to optimize the achievement of the
purpose, it would be a valuable aid, not only in the formulating of laws,
but also in providing the intelligent voter with a sound basis upon which
to make his decision.
As far as those who advocate that operations analysis can accomplish
everything are concerned, there are natural restrictions which limit their
claims. First, there is the requirement that the executive have some
degree of control over the operation. Compliance with man-made laws may
effectively remove the operation from the control of the executive, in
other cases the laws of nature may accomplish the same removal.
The second limiting factor in the scope of operations analysis is
one's ability to decide upon the purpose of the operation. As the oper-
ation becomes increasingly complex, this problem becomes increasingly
difficult.
The third limitation on the scope of operations analysis is the
ability to solve a problem, once the purpose has been decided upon.
Since the solution takes the form of optimizing the achievement of
14

purpose, it is quite evident some measurement to be used for comparison
is an essential part, and the analyst must be able to produce a yard-
stick of values which is acceptable to all. As J. Kills (5, Page 2k)
wrote:
It has been well said by one of the leading physicists of the
nineteenth century that when you can measure what you are
speaking about and express it in numbers you know something
about it, but when you cannot, your knowledge is of a meagre
and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge,
but you have scarcely in your thoughts advanced to the stage
of science.
There are many problems today for which no commonly accepted yardstick
of measurement exists.
This is particularly true in problems involving human beings. In
many cases, the human being is the most important component in an oper-
ation, and the analyst is deeply interested in finding ways to evaluate
such qualities as leadership, morale, ability, and the like. Since in
repeated operations men and machines have been observed to behave in a
highly predictable manner, a number of problems can be solved by making
use of this repetitive feature. Ijew developments in the fields of
human engineering, psychology, and related subjects offer great hope of
extending the scope of operations analysis in problems of this type.
In other fields, in the same manner that Newton invented calculus
in order to make his mathematical model of the planetary system duplicate
Kepler's Laws and at the same time explain the force of gravity, modern
men of science are developing new disciplines such as game theory, linear
programming, information theory and the like to extend the areas in which




AN APPLICATION OF OPERATIONS ANALYSIS
1. The Aircraft Anti-submarine Depth Charge
Up to this point, we have discussed operations analysis in broad
terms to gain some understanding of its meaning, and the scope of the
problems to which it may be applied. Let us turn now to an analysis
of an early application to a complex operation. The example chosen is
the problem of determining the proper setting of the anti-submarine
depth charge. It is a good example in that it demonstrates the diffi-
culty of the operator in the field when faced with the problem of
determining the optimum use of a relatively new weapon.
Early in World i'/ar II, the British Coastal Command used ordinary
bombs against German Submarines. Since these proved ineffectual,
depth charges were adapted for aircraft use. At that time, the tactics
were based on a belief that the best setting was 100 feet, where the
charge would be well "tamped" by the water. There were those, called
"deep setters" who advocated a setting of 150 feet, as well as "shallow
setters" who believed a setting of 50 feet was best. Since the set-
tings could not be changed in flight, both sides could argue effective-
ly as to the relative merits of their particular setting.
Let us digress for a moment and ask the question, "7/hat is the
purpose in determining the depth charge setting?" Is it to determine
a setting which will insure a maximum explosive effect IF the greatest
percentage of submarines is at that particular depth, or is it to
determine the setting which will actually sink the most submarines?
While all would agree that the true purpose of determining the setting
16

is to find the one that will sink the most submarines, many people
failed to draw a distinction between the two purposes. These people
directed their efforts toward the accomplishment of the first purpose,
for they felt that if they could set the depth charges to explode with
a maximum blast effect at the most probable depth of the submarine,
they were automatically insuring the greatest number of submarine sink-
ings. But they overlooked the fact that, as the submarine sinks deeper
/
and deeper, its "escape radius" increases much more rapidly than the
>
"lethal radius" of the depth charge, so that the effect of "tamping"
is wasted.
The problem was given to a group of British scientists. By analyz-
ing the existing data and making use of some simple laws of probability
they were able to determine the optimum depth charge setting. Their
conclusion was to set the charges to explode at 25 feet, and not to
drop depth charges if the submarine had been submerged for more than
half a minute. '.Vithin a few months after this change in doctrine was
made, the actual effectiveness of aircraft anti-submarine attacks
increased by a factor of two, and the Germans announced to their navy
that the British had introduced a new and much more powerful depth
charge.
It is only natural, when results could be attained by the appli-
cation of such seemingly simple techniques, to suppose that the
solution was really simple. However, when we return to an analysis of
the problem, we see that the answer was not so obvious to the partici-
pants. As far as the operators in the field were concerned, their
experiences could not furnish them with the answer, for many pilots
went throughout the entire war without ever sighting a submarine, and
17

in those cases where attacks were made, the evaluation of the effective-
ness of the attack was in many cases very difficult to make. One could
hardly expect the ordnance expert to furnish the solution, for while he
could be counted on to furnish a very sound, scientific reason to explode
a depth charge at a setting for maximum explosive effectiveness, he could
hardly be expected to know aircraft attack procedures, or submarine
escape tactics. The only ones who could possess all of the information
necessary for the solution of a problem of this type were those in the
major commands. To solve the problem required a certain knowledge of
probability and statistics, as well as aircraft and submarine performance
characteristics and tactics. The scientist had the mathematical hack-
ground, while the operator could furnish the operational information.
Together they could solve a problem which might appear very formidable
to each working separately. This approach provided the solution, and





THE FORMAL OPERATIONS ANALYSIS ORGANIZATION
1. The Requirements of the Organization
The successful employment of trained scientists for assisting
military commanders, such as in the instance we have discussed, led to
a more or less standard type of operations analysis organization which
the military has used to the present time. It is only natural that as
experience was gained, that several needs and working requirements be-
came evident if operations analysis was to be used most effectively.
/
First, it soon became evident that the analysis grouos needed to
f
be in a position where it was possible to obtain an overall view of the
operation being studied. For only in such a position could they gain
unrestricted access to all of the information so vital to analyzing a
complex operation. A consideration of this need usually resulted in
the analysis groups being attached near the top eschelon of command.
Secondly, it became obvious that if one scientist was helpful,
two were even more so. Each particular field of science had method-
ologies sufficiently different to warrant their applications to
various features of operational problems. This led to the formation
of teams composed of scientists drawn from widely different fields of
science.
Lastly, it became evident that operations analysis had utility
only when applied to real problems. It created nothing new in science
(although the analysis of an operation often led to research in the
field of new inventions or weapons). As a result, analysis groups were
most effective when assigned to organizations which had control over
19

the operation involved, and who had the necessary authority to implement
new doctrines or tactics.
2. Operations Analysis Groups in the Navy
In April 1942 with the cooperation of the Anti-Submarine Division
of the National Defense Research Committee, seven scientists were re-
cruited by Columbia University, and assigned to the Anti-submarine
Warfare Unit, Atlantic Fleet. By July 1943, the group had grown to a
strength of approximately forty members. It was then incorporated into
the staff of the Tenth Fleet as the Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations
Research Group. Subsequently, the administrative responsibility for the
group was transferred from Columbia University to the Office of Field
Service, without alteration in relationship with the Navy. In October
1944, the group was transferred to the Readiness Division of the Head-
quarters of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, and renamed the Oper-
ations Research Group. At the close of the war, it consisted of
seventy-three scientists, drawn from a wide variety of fields. Many
of the group were attached to the staffs of fleet and type commanders,
and to operating forces in war theatres.
From the nature of their assignment, it was only natural that a
great portion of their effort was devoted to the anti-submarine problems
This comprised over 50$ of their work, and they effectively dealt with
such problems as convoy screens, optimum sizes of convoys, optimum
speeds of convoys, and search plans. They did important work in radar
counter measures, and dealt with such submarine problems as increasing
torpedo effectiveness and determination of salvo size. Much of their




and the problems with which they dealt is contained in Operations
Evaluation Group Report 54, Methods of Operations Research (8).
The work of the Operations Research Group is at present being
carried on for the Navy by the Operations Evaluation Group, an organ-
ization comprised of fifty civilian scientists. The work of the
Operations Evaluation Group is of a similar nature as that performed
by the Operations Research Group. They serve as advisors to the Chief
of Naval Operations, and many of their members can be found in the




PRES3NT NEED FOR OPERATIONS ..NALY3IS IN THE NAVY
1. The Impact of Technology on Military Operations
To understand the need for operations analysis in the Navy, one
must realize the tremendous impact of recent technological advances on
military operations. These advances have radically changed the nature
of warfare, and made the military commander's problems of decision im-
measurably more difficult. Consider the case of the commander of a
warship one hundred years ago, and his counterpart today. One hundred
years ago, the commander could safely rely upon his experiences to
guide him in his relatively simple problems of decision. Today, the
situation that the commanding officer faces is much more complex, in
that the tools of the operation have radically changed. With the advent
of radar, high performance power plants, startling innovations in
weapons systems, and the like, the commander is forced to rely more and
more upon the advice of his specialists. However, like his counterpart
of one hundred years a^o, he must, in the final analysis, assemble all
the facts and opinions and from them formulate his own decision. It is
in this respect that operations analysis is the first new discipline
desi,-ned to help him in the very important problems of decision. The
analyst, like the commander, views the overall operation; in so doing,
he must use scientific methods to establish correlation between differ-
ent components of the operation to arrive at a sound basis for decision.
Operations analysis treats an.; r type of an operation as never being
fully developed. A study of the experiences of '.','orld War II reveals
that whenever tactics were developed to meet an enemy threat, a change
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in enemy tactics necessitated a re-evaluation of our own doctrine.
Since the enemy is likewise capable of enlisting the aid of science in
his operations, continuing evaluation of new advances in science, both
in terms of our use and the enemy's is a military necessity. While the
sense of urgency may be lessened in peacetime, in many cases the problems
of decision may be more difficult. New inventions may indicate changes
in operations, but certain considerations may limit their implementation.
For instance, a new fuel may render existing fuels obsolete, but stocks
on hand might deserve consideration. The executive must decide in terms
of economy, effectiveness of the fighting forces, and availability of
new equipment when to make a change. Operations analysis, with its
ordered scientific approach, is a powerful aid in these problems of de-
cision.
2. The Scientific Collection of Data
The analyst is concerned with the scientific collection of data, for
data are necessary in the solution of practical problems. Since many of
the problems which lend themselves to an operations analysis solution deal
with repeated operations, statistically significant quantities of data
are usually available. Unfortunately, in many cases where data have
previously been collected, much of it is unusable. It is significant to
note that during the last war, where quantities of data were collected,
many months were needlessly spent by Operations Research Groups in sift-
ing masses of irrelevant a&ta to obtain pertinent operational facts.
The collection of data is both time consuming and costly and thus is a
problem which deserves consideration. The analyst has had special train-
ing as a scientist in making observations and determining what data are
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significant to a problem, and it seems to the writer that fuller employe
ment of the services of the analyst in the scientific collection of data
is desirable.
The methods of operations analysis may be readily applied to the
preparation of data request forms, in that the purpose should first be
subjected to careful analysis and then the form prepared to optimize
the achievement of that purpose. Once the data have been collected,
IBM machines may be used to process them. In this form data may be
easily stored for subsequent use if the need arises.
3. Liaison Between the Scientist and the Executive
As the world becomes increasingly technical, the gulf between the
executive and the scientist widens. The practical inventor has almost
vanished from the scientific scene today, giving way to the formally
trained teams of researchers, exploring new concepts unfamiliar to most
people, and employing their own scientific language. While Ruskin may
have over simplified when he observed, "A great deal of the supposed
scientific writing of the day is simply bad English, and vanishes the
moment you translate it", even this matter of translation may pose a
very effective barrier to most executives. Operations analysis pro-
vides a bridge between the executive and the scientist.
When one considers the need for solving problems imposed by new
technological advances, the collection of data, and liaison between the
technical world of science and the executive, the continuing need for
operations analysis in the Navy is evident. Certainly no one expects
future operations to become less complex, and if anything this need
must grow. Heretofore, all formal operations analysis for the Navy has
been performed by groups of civilian scientists. Recently, the Navy has
2k
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instituted a program of training naval officers in operations analysis.
The next two chapters will discuss some of the advantages and problems





1. Preservation of the Civilian atmosphere
Most civilian analysts believe that the preservation of their
civilian status is an essential requirement in their performance of oper-
ations analysis for the Navy. The working routine of the scientist runs
counter to that of the military man in many respects. The military man
lives in a world of real problems, and is accustomed to giving decisive
orders. An operation can't be stopped until the military commander
makes up his mind. On the other hand, the civilian scientist believes
he should be divorced from the responsibility of issuing orders about an
operation, and instead should be able to study the operation as it pro-
ceeds. It is not implied that the military man gives orders without
serious reflection on the problem, or that the scientist cannot give an
order, but rather that the military man must decide upon the evident
facts at hand, utilizing experience and guidance from other sources,
while the scientist, in his employment of scientific methods, accepts
only those things which can be proven. Urgency dictates the former,
while the latter is demanded for sound analysis.
The civilian analyst feels that deference to higher authority may
prevent the analyst from arriving at the true solution of a problem,
and believes that this danger is more apt to occur if he is a member of
a strongly disciplined military organization. There is, of course, a
danger that any analyst will include only those facts which are con-
sistent with a senior's wishes. Such a practice can hardly be called
operations analysis, and may be disastrous in that the executive may
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be misled into placing more faith in the report than it deserves. The
civilian analyst believes his status enables him to approach all ranks
in the military organization with greater equality.
We have briefly discussed the importance of the operations analysis
team. In this respect, the use of civilian groups has distinct ad-
vantages because of their ability to find, train, and keep the right
personnel. Provided that the scientist is available, the only problem
of the group is to enlist his services. They can afford to be selective,
and can rapidly advance the most capable members. Closely associated
with this ability to staff a team with competent members, is the problem
of training. The finished analysis represents the composite views of the
members, and the healthy freedom of discussion and simultaneous prepara-
tion of the analysis, lend themselves easily to an "on the job" training
program. The civilian group can offer greater permanence to its members,
and hence does not have the problem of rebuilding the organization peri-
odically. The members of the civilian groups are scientists working in
their chosen fields of study. When a member desires more formal train-
ing, such opportunity can readily be made available to him. Because
they have the opportunity to retain their professional competence they
can remain in close touch with all of the advances of science.
2. Problems Arising in the Employment of Civilian Analysts.
It is well for the military man to have an understanding of some
of the problems of the civilian analyst, for he is often in a position
to help him. One of the most important handicaps of the civilian analyst
is his lack of operational experience. For the analyst to truly under-
stand the problem, he must have some feeling for the operational environ-
ment, particularly as it effects the human component. The simple,
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mathematical solution of a search problem, employing a definite ran Te
law of detection, may become a very difficult operation to an exhausted
search crew, buffetted about by the elements. It inn't that the analyst
is not aware of these problems ( in many cases they have done a rreat
deal of work making the military more aware of them); the point is, that
just as there is need to acquaint the military man with the ways of the
scientist, there exists a need to acquaint the analyst with the oper-
ation, and in both cases a considerable time for indoctrination is re-
quired.
The problem of determining the civilian analyst's position in the
military organization is often times a difficult one. '.Vhen the military
formally contracts for operational analysis, about the only serious
problems that arise are in regard to security restrictions and in pro-
viding operational data and trials. However, when the analyst is called
upon to work in the theatre of operations, difficulties arise in defin-
ing his status in the command organization. This is a real and vexing
problem, as Kimball and Morse (7, Page 1^0) in writing of the experi-
ences of the Operations Research Group have noted:
In an outlying theatre of operations, however, it is usually
necessary for the worker to be in uniform. Sometimes the worker
has been given a temporary rank, sufficient for him to perform
his functions without undue embarassment. This temporary rank
has some disadvantages, however, for it immobilizes him in the
military hierarchy and makes it difficult for him to approach
lower echelons on terms of equality. Sometimes it has been
possible to avoid the question of temporary rank and give the
worker some special insignia. This also has difficulties, for
proper accommodations and entrance into necessary headquarters
are often only available to officers, and the special insignia
may not be recognized as being the equivalent of an officer.
It can be seen that many of the problems which arise when civilian
analysts are employed, are those which can best be resolved on an
28
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individual basis. Civilian groups have made vital contributions to the
success of military operations in the past, and it seems only logical






1. The Training of the Officer Analyst
As already noted, the Navy has instituted a program of training
officer analysts at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, The purpose of
tiie curriculum is to educate officers in the basic sciences and to pro-
vide a thorough grounding in the theory and methods of operational
Lysis, in order that they may direct the analytical approach to
complex naval problems.
The question of whether or not one can learn operations analysis
as a result of formal training is of fundamental importance. In this
country, an increasing number of prominent colleges and universities
are giving formal instruction in operations analysis. They include:
The Case Institute of Technology, Dartmouth College, John Hopkins
University, and The Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The
Illinois Institute of Technology has announced the addition of a
graduate course, called "Introduction to Operations Research", and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology has established an Interdepart-
mental Committee on Operations Research to inquire into and advise on
training students in the field. The most extensive instruction offered
anywhere in operations analysis, is that given at the U.S. Naval
Postgraduate School. Many of its faculty members have had experience
with operations analysis groups. Thi Navy, along with the above
civilian institutions, believes that operations analysis has progressed
to the point which permits formal instruction in its methodology, but




At the present time, the mathematics portion in the operations
analysis curriculum at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School consists of
54 hours, which includes vector analysis, differential equations, proba-
bility and statistics, matrix theory, theory of games, statistical de-
cision functions, and high speed computing machines. The physics
portion consists of 47 hours, and includes courses in optics, analytical
mechanics, electricity and magnetism, acoustics, kinetic theory and
statistical mechanics, atomic physics, and nuclear physics. At present
34 hours are devoted to formal operations analysis studies, including
an introductory course, search theory, effectiveness of weapons, optimal
weapons systems, logistic analysis, and theory of information. Survey
courses are given in chemistry, radar, operational aspects of meteorology,
and aircraft performance evaluation. Summer field trips are planned so
that the students are given an opportunity to visit and work with ci-
vilian and military organizations having operations analysis groups.
2. Problems Arising in the Employment of Officer Analysts.
Just as there are problems which arise when civilian groups are em-
ployed to do operations analysis for the military, there are problems that
arise when naval officers are employed. Some of these are of such a
serious nature as to raise the question of whether or not these officers
can ever be considered true operations analysts. In this connection, the
writer is not considering the case where the typical officer applies the
methods of operations analysis to arrive at solutions of his problems,
for it is felt that this is both feasible and desirable, but rather to the
general subject which deals with the professional competence of the
officer specifically designated as an operations analyst.
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The civilian analyst is basically a scientist, engaged in the pur-
suit of his life's work, Surrounded by other competent scientists, he
has the opportunity to study the latest scientific advances and to
readily avail himself of further formal education in scientific fields.
On the other hand, the officer analyst is above all a naval officer.
As is true for any officer, he must insure that his experiences qualify
him for promotion when due; thus his rotation in duties will bring about
assignments where he is not acting in the formal capacity as an oper-
ations analyst. While this is a problem which faces all officers with
a specialty, unless the analyst actively works on operations analysis
problems, the benefits of his formal education may be largely lost. As
a naval officer he is expected to actively participate in the operation
(as contrasted with the civilian analyst who figuratively sits on the
side lines and studies the operation) and shoulder his share of collater-
al duties. Were he not to do this, it would soon reflect on his
competence as a naval officer.
There are questions which arise when we consider the status of the
officer analyst in the command organization. We have briefly discussed
the importance of having an overall view of the operation. It is the
military philosophy that knowledge of the operation, responsibility,
and authority go hand in hand. In turn, responsibility and authority
go with rank. We have already noticed that civilian analysts have felt
that the desired status in the organization is one which permits
knowledge of all aspects of the operation, but which is accompanied by
little power and responsibility. The writer is not sure which is the
more incongruous, the officer analyst with high rank and little authority
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and responsibility, or the officer analyst with low rank and broad
knowledge of the operation.
In military organizations the chain of command is scrupulously
adhered to. This is necessary, otherwise conflicting orders and
confusion arise. The officer analyst will, of course, take his proper
position in this chain of command. This may effectively limit the
analyst's knowledge of 'the operation; at the very least it will often
occasion the transmission of technical information via non-technical
channels with obviously undesirable effects.
V/e have briefly discussed the importance of the operations analysis
team. So widespread is the belief in the team effort, that it is often
used as the defining feature of operations analysis. L.A. Brothers
(1, Page 16) writes:
Operations analysis is team research. A team of analysts is
assigned to a problem, the analyst being selected so as to bring
to bear on the problem the scientific skills judged most applic-
able to its solution.
P. LI. Morse (6, Page 603)notes:
a number of branches of science are called upon for help.
For example, physics is required for a basic understanding of
the operational possibilities of the machines involved, and
biophysics and psychophysics are required in order to under-
stand the capabilities of the human components. Mathematics is
basic to all of the work During the- vrar it was found that
a mathematician, a physicist, and a biologist together make up
a research team of considerai le effectiveness.
The benefits of team research is perhaps best expressed by Newton's
modest statement, "If I have seen further than most, it is because I
stood on the shoulders of giant s". One of the first questions of the
officer analyst might well be in regard to his team. It would certain-
ly be j resuaptious for him to believe that he alone could perform an
\ analysis as efficiently as the previously required team of scientists.
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Another point which should be considered in the use of officer
analysts is the problem of centralization to avoid duplication. In an
organization such as the Operations Evaluation Group, all analysts,
including field workers, know what problems the organization is working
on. At present there is no established#procedure permitting the officer
analyst in one command to know what another command has done except where
the results are made available in print. It is in the formulating and
solving stage of the problem that the free exchange of information is most
helpful. Without some form of direction, considerable duplication of
effort will result.
The writer has no way of knowing to what degree the above problems
will determine the eventual effectiveness of the officer as an analyst;
as in the case of the civilian analyst many of them can undoubtedly be
resolved on a personal basis. They do, however, seem to merit considera-
tion lest operations analysis be thought of as just another form of
staff study. It is, of course, too early to determine the true value
of the officer analyst, for it will depend largely upon the individual
competence of the officers assigned to this duty, as well as recognition
of the need for their services.
13. Advantages in Using Officer Analysts.
As in the case of the civilian analysts, there are several special
reasons why the naval officer should make a good operations analyst. His
operational background should prove invaluable to him in the formulation
and solving of the problem. Because he is a member of the operational
organization, his problem in overcoming security and censorship regula-
tions should be less difficult than his civilian counterpart. Since he
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is at the scene of operations, his training should enable him to recog-
nize problems where operations analysis can be applied without waiting
for others to formally request a study.
While we have talked largely about considerations involved in the
actual solution of problems, we have noted that this is only one phase
of operations analysis. With regard to the scientific collection of data,
liaison between the executive and the scientist, and evaluation of oper-
ational analysis studies made by other agencies for the Navy, the training





1. Future Uses of Operations Analysis in the Navy.
In this study we have discussed in general terms the meaning of
operations analysis and its scope. Previously in the Navy, operations
analysis has been applied largely to problems arising in combat oper-
ations such as in the example of the aircraft depth charge problem.
This is in keeping with the idea expressed in OEG Report 54 (8, Page 138)
which states:
It must be apparent that an operations research group must be
attached to the operational commands in a military organization.
The logistic and technical commands have their problems requir-
ing scientific personnel for their solution, but this sort of
work is not what is meant by operations research.
Since that time, however, the methods of operations analysis have been
applied in many widely different fields with success, and it seems un-
wise to restrict unnecessarily the types of problems dealt with by
operations analysis groups in the Navy. Such applications have ranged
all the way from studies of "Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Array" (3)
to "Application of the Simplex Method to a Transportation Problem"(4).
In particular, important work is being done on problems related to
inventory control j a matter of obvious interest in the field of Logistics.
In the same manner, studies such as "The Failure of Complex Equipment"(10)
may prove to be of original interest to the technical commands.
In operations analysis, as in all fields of scientific research,
discoveries in one field are often of great importance in a seemingly
different one. As an example, in the field of Economics, Leontieff 's
Input-Output technique of studying the national economy is a new idea
to develop quantitative methods for dealing with the enormous amounts of
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empirical data involved in every real economic situation. Yet its
principle appears to be capable of application to such a seemingly
different problem as the task of programming individuals into a train-
ing organization. In the final analysis, it would be difficult to find
any department of the Navy which would not be able to benefit through »
the application of the methods of operations analysis. At the present
time, there are feiv analysts in the Navy, and many officers are un-
familiar v.ith this new discipline. As this situation is corrected, more
and more problems can be subjected to its discipline.
2. Civilian or Officer Analyst.
When one reviews the respective qualifications and working conditions
of the officer analyst and the civilian analyst, the question as to which
to use loses a great deal of its significance. It is apparent at once that
there are many cases wherein each can assist the other. The civilian
analyst prefers his status because he can work on a problem, detached from
the responsibilities of qjerational decisions. In so doin ;, he is dependent
upon the executive to furnish him problems and operational data. By draw-
ing upon the knowledge possessed by other scientists of the team, the
civilian analyst is in a position to work on very complicated problems.
His status enables him to move freely in scientific circles. On the other
hand, the officer analyst may find that his close contact with the oper-
ation is beneficial for an understanding of the problem, but his partici-
pation in the operation may seriously reduce the time he has available for
scientific research. In the absence of assistance from a team of fellow-
analysts, the types of problems he can solve will be necessarily restricted.
He will be able to move freely in the military organization since he is a
member of it, but the problem of following the latest scientific advances
will be a difficult one.
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The v/riter believes that both the civilian analyst and the officer
analyst have definite roles to perform in the -avy, and that the question
which should be of interest is not which one to use, but rather, how can
each be used most effectively?
This question may be answered in part by providing liaison between
the civilian group and the officer analyst. The officer analyst, at the
scene of the operation, may serve the civilian group in the same manner
as their presently employed field workers, while the civilian group is in
a position to assist the officer analyst in the solution of many problems
beyond his ability. At the present time this liaison is conspicuous by
its absence, yet the mutual benefits which could accrue indicate that
consideration should be given to provide this liaison.
At the present time, operations analysis is an unfamiliar discipline
to most of its potential users. In line with the problem of employing the
analyst most efficiently, studies should be made on how best to acquaint
all naval officers with uses of operations analysis in the Navy. Undoubted-
ly, the usual general information articles would be helpful. Formal
introductory courses could be given at institutions such as the Naval
Academy, The General Line School, and the War College. At present, in-
struction in operations analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School is
limited to line officers. In view of the many possible applications of
operations analysis to problems other than those arising in combat oper-
ations, consideration should be given to lifting this restriction.
3. Summary
One sees in operations analysis another manifestation of man's never
ending struggle to gain control over situations in which he finds himself.
Science, in its search for truth, adds to man's knowledge and increases
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this control, while operations analysis provides him with answers of
how best to exercise this control. As a new discipline, operations
analysis suffers the usual growing pains resulting from a lack of
accepted definition of scope and purpose. This is to' be expected,
since the evolution of any new scientific discipline is at best a slow
process. Those who find its methods too slow, or its applications too
limited should not be discouraged, for we can use it imperfectly and in
part while it is developing.
Operations analysis, by using scientific methods to decide upon a
purpose and then optimize the achievement of this purpose, provides a
sound basis upon which to make decisions. If we rigorously follow the
methods of operations analysis, we can feel confident that the decision
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